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Tag: culture

  • Why the Jobs Argument Is Hurting Pharma

    Why the Jobs Argument Is Hurting Pharma

    Anyone advocating for better conditions for the pharmaceutical industry—whether trade associations, company representatives, investors, or politicians—eventually reaches for the same argument:

    “Hundreds of thousands of jobs depend directly and indirectly on this industry.”

    And therefore, the argument goes, policymakers cannot ignore it.

    They can. And they should.

    Not because the numbers are wrong. They may well be accurate. The problem is that they measure the wrong thing.

    The Argument Defeats Itself

    Using employment as a justification for reimbursement policy, industrial policy, or market access decisions is a strategy more commonly associated with industries in decline.

    Germany’s coal and steel sector relied on it. The Swiss watch industry did so during the quartz crisis of the 1970s. Parts of the automotive sector continue to use it today—with diminishing success.

    The implicit message is always the same:

    We are too large to change. Protect us.

    The problem is that structural change rarely negotiates with employment statistics. Societies that allowed industries to adapt—sometimes slowly, sometimes painfully—have generally emerged stronger than those that tried to preserve existing structures indefinitely.

    The jobs argument therefore does not defend the pharmaceutical industry’s societal value. Instead, it unintentionally suggests that more compelling arguments may be unavailable.

    For a sector as important as pharmaceuticals, that is an own goal.

    A Strong Industry Making a Weak Argument

    Pharmaceuticals are not a declining industry. They are among the most research-intensive, capital-intensive, and socially consequential sectors in the global economy.

    Between 1990 and 2015, roughly one-third of the global increase in life expectancy has been attributed to pharmaceutical innovation. The industry invests more than $240 billion annually in research and development, making it one of the world’s largest investors in innovation.

    Reducing that contribution to a discussion about jobs means abandoning the strongest argument available.

    Worse still, the employment narrative invites an uncomfortable counterargument:

    Would society be better off if those jobs were allocated elsewhere?

    The moment employment becomes the primary justification, that question becomes legitimate.

    Defending innovation is a far stronger position than defending employment for its own sake.

    The Debate We Should Be Having

    The pharmaceutical industry possesses substantial arguments. They simply receive far less attention than they deserve.

    Consider innovation.

    A new therapy often enters public debate only when its budget impact becomes visible. Yet medicines that reduce hospitalisations, delay dependency, avoid rehabilitation costs, or improve productivity frequently create value far beyond the healthcare budget line item where they are assessed.

    Both dominant health technology assessment frameworks share a similar structural blind spot.

    QALY-based approaches, used in countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, attempt to capture gains in quality and length of life. Yet broader societal benefits often remain outside the analysis.

    Meanwhile, comparative clinical-benefit frameworks such as those used by Germany’s IQWiG or France’s HAS focus on incremental clinical benefit relative to standard of care. They measure relative clinical value, but not necessarily total societal value.

    Productivity gains, caregiver relief, reduced social expenditure, and avoided downstream costs frequently remain invisible under both approaches.

    This is not merely a technical limitation. It is a structural valuation problem—and one that deserves a far more open debate.

    The evolution of NICE’s cost-effectiveness threshold illustrates the point. For more than two decades, from 1999 to 2025, the benchmark remained largely unchanged at approximately £20,000 per QALY. Adjusted for inflation, the figure would have been close to £30,000 by the end of that period. In real terms, the threshold had been quietly tightening for years before NICE finally revised it upward in late 2025.

    The adjustment acknowledged the pressure. It also revealed how long that pressure had been ignored.

    International reference pricing presents another example.

    The system effectively penalises transparency. Countries that disclose negotiated prices often receive less favourable terms, while manufacturers delay launches in lower-price markets to avoid creating downward pressure elsewhere.

    Germany has long served as a prominent example of this dynamic.

    This is not merely a pharmaceutical problem. It is a structural flaw in the way many international pricing systems interact with one another. It deserves a serious policy discussion, and the industry could play a constructive role in shaping solutions rather than merely reacting to them.

    Supply-chain resilience provides another case.

    The issue is frequently framed as one of preserving jobs. In reality, it is a question of strategic security.

    As active pharmaceutical ingredient production becomes increasingly concentrated in Asia, healthcare systems become more vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, manufacturing disruptions, and quality failures.

    The relevant question is not whether jobs remain in a particular country.

    The question is whether societies are comfortable with critical dependencies in areas directly linked to public health.

    That is an argument about resilience, not employment.

    Incentives Matter on Both Sides

    The pharmaceutical industry is not the only actor operating within imperfect incentives.

    Generic penetration rates in many European markets remain well below the roughly 90 percent levels achieved in the United States. As a result, healthcare systems often continue paying more than necessary for medicines whose patent protection expired long ago.

    Those resources could potentially be redirected toward innovation.

    At the same time, pharmaceutical companies face distortions of their own.

    In Switzerland, for example, reimbursement negotiations that are formally expected to conclude within sixty days often take a year or longer. When effective market access delays consume a meaningful portion of a patent’s commercial life, pricing behaviour inevitably adjusts.

    This does not justify every pricing decision.

    But it does illustrate a broader point.

    Constructive debate requires acknowledging structural distortions on all sides. The goal should not be to assign blame. It should be to design incentives and institutions that reduce the need for defensive behaviour in the first place.

    A Question of Values and Systems

    Once the discussion shifts away from employment and toward value, access, incentives, and sustainability, a deeper reality emerges.

    The fundamental disagreements are not technical.

    They are societal.

    Questions such as:

    • How should limited healthcare resources be allocated?Should systems prioritise broad access to inexpensive treatments or fewer breakthrough innovations that prevent future costs?
    • What about externalized effects — who gets to benefit or carry the burden?
      A drug that renders hospital stays unnecessary relieves one budget but burdens another; this transfer remains invisible during price negotiations.
    • Where does individual responsibility end and collective responsibility begin?
      How should societies think about conditions influenced by lifestyle choices?

    None of these questions has a universally correct answer. They reflect societal priorities and value judgments.

    Yet these debates are often displaced by power dynamics. The stakeholder with the strongest leverage frequently defines the framework within which discussions occur.

    That is the real problem. Not the number of jobs.

    Patient organisations, HTA agencies, pharmaceutical companies, physicians, health economists, hospitals, payers, and biotech investors all bring different perspectives to these questions.

    The fact that many of these perspectives remain marginal in public discussions about pharmaceutical policy is symptomatic of a debate that too often confuses bargaining power with analytical rigor.

    Neither a Zero-Sum Game Nor a Simple Equation

    The pharmaceutical industry operates within a genuine structural dilemma.

    Patent protection creates temporary monopolies in order to incentivise innovation.

    Reimbursement systems were largely designed for blockbuster medicines, not for orphan drugs, preventive therapies, or antibiotics.

    Payers face democratic budget pressures and frequently employ tactics that many private-sector negotiators would consider problematic.

    These tensions are real. They require real answers. Employment statistics do not provide them. They trigger political reflexes while distracting attention from the substantive questions that matter most.

    Could higher pharmaceutical spending reduce overall healthcare expenditure by preventing hospitalisations and costly downstream interventions?

    Are intermediary structures in the U.S. healthcare system—such as pharmacy benefit managers and vertically integrated insurance groups—capturing value that never reaches patients?

    Should international pricing mechanisms implicitly reward dysfunctional market structures elsewhere?

    Are regulatory delays shortening effective patent life to a degree that undermines investment incentives?

    These are difficult questions. They cannot be reduced to slogans, and they do not fit neatly into press releases. But they belong at the centre of public debate.

    A Better Way Forward

    The pharmaceutical industry should stop defending itself primarily through employment statistics. Instead, it should quantify societal value more comprehensively—capturing both positive and negative externalities across the healthcare system.

    It should not only justify its own prices. It should also highlight sources of value destruction elsewhere in the system: inefficient intermediaries, excessive administrative complexity, and actors that extract economic value without creating corresponding clinical value.

    It should not fight HTA frameworks as such. It should help improve them. And it should move beyond defending list prices toward developing pricing models that share uncertainty rather than transferring it entirely to one side. Outcome-based reimbursement is not a concession. It is an invitation to genuine partnership.

    The pharmaceutical industry has no shortage of strong arguments. Employment simply is not the strongest one.

    Let’s stop talking about jobs. Let’s talk about value.

  • CEO Espresso highlights from 2025: Strategy

    CEO Espresso highlights from 2025: Strategy

    What distinguishes a strategy on paper from one that is actually lived?

    We asked CEOs from very different contexts exactly that. Their answers varied, but they all revolved around one theme: consequence.

    🔹 Gunnar Pahnke, CEO of Azerfon: “Execution is directly linked to the bonus payments of all CXOs — over a three-year period. A large share is not paid out annually, but only after the three years have passed.”

    🔹 Guillaume Dubrule, CEO of Rexel Germany: “When the financial results are right and the engagement indicators are moving up — then the strategy is not only understood, but lived.”

    🔹 Sahil Tapiawala, CEO of Atomionics: “I constantly ask myself: This is what we set out to achieve over the next three, six, nine months — did we get there? If not, why not? And what could I have done differently?”

    Three companies, three scales, three continents — and yet the same fundamental question: who takes responsibility for ensuring that the strategy actually lands?

    Pahnke’s answer is radically consistent: those who help decide the strategy have a stake in making it happen, because they also carry the financial consequences — deferred, over several years. That creates a different kind of focus than an annual bonus.

    Dubrule’s answer reveals that strategy shows up both in numbers and in attitude. Both have to be right. One alone is not enough.

    And Tapiawala, who leads a deep-tech startup, asks himself the same questions as the head of a large corporation — only without hierarchy as a protective layer. Because we have more influence over the outcome than we often admit. This mindset of ownership and self-efficacy cannot be delegated.

    Commitment does not arise from better slides. It arises where clear consequences are drawn.


    +++ Deutsche Version +++ German version +++

    Was unterscheidet eine Strategie auf dem Papier von einer, die gelebt wird?

    Wir haben CEOs aus sehr unterschiedlichen Kontexten genau das gefragt. Die Antworten unterschieden sich, kreisten aber alle um das Thema: Konsequenz.

    🔹 Gunnar Pahnke, CEO von Azerfon: “Die Umsetzung ist direkt mit den Bonuszahlungen aller CXOs verknüpft, und zwar über drei Jahre. Denn ein Großteil wird nicht jährlich ausgezahlt, sondern erst nach Ablauf der drei Jahre.”

    🔹 Guillaume Dubrule, CEO von Rexel Germany: “Wenn die finanziellen Ergebnisse stimmen und die Engagement-Indikatoren nach oben zeigen — dann ist die Strategie nicht nur verstanden, sondern gelebt.”

    🔹 Sahil Tapiawala, CEO von Atomionics: “Ich frage mich ständig: Das haben wir uns für die nächsten drei, sechs, neun Monate vorgenommen — haben wir es erreicht? Wenn nicht: warum nicht? Und was hätte ich anders tun können?”

    Drei Unternehmen, drei Größenordnungen, drei Kontinente — und doch dieselbe Grundfrage: Wer trägt die Verantwortung dafür, dass die Strategie ankommt?

    Pahnkes Antwort ist radikal konsequent: Wer die Strategie mitentscheidet, hat ein Interesse an ihrer Verwirklichung, da er auch finanziell die Konsequenz trägt — verzögert, über Jahre. Das schafft einen anderen Fokus als der jährliche Bonus.

    Dubrules Antwort offenbart: Strategie zeigt sich in Zahlen und in Haltung. Beides muss stimmen. Nur eines reicht nicht.

    Und Tapiawala, der ein Deep-Tech-Startup führt, stellt sich dieselben Fragen wie ein Konzernchef — nur ohne Hierarchie als Schutzschicht. Denn wir haben mehr Einfluss über das Ergebnis, als wir uns oft eingestehen. Diese Haltung der Eigenverantwortung und Selbstwirksamkeit lässt sich nicht delegieren.

    Verbindlichkeit entsteht nicht durch bessere Folien. Sie entsteht dort, wo klare Konsequenzen gezogen werden.

  • Entrepreneurship

    Entrepreneurship

    Last night at Pitch & Pretzels, hosted at KPMG’s offices in Cologne, the focus was naturally on ideas.

    What problem does the startup want to solve?
    What market is it addressing? How big could this become?
    How convincing is the team?
    And, of course: how do idea, capital, and execution come together?

    But another question stayed with me: even if the idea, market, and team are compelling, how critical is a resilient web of relationships?

    With co-founders. With investors. With employees.
    With first customers. With suppliers. With cooperation partners.
    Later perhaps with corporate partners, boards, or buyers.

    Each of these relationships brings expectations and agreements with it. A startup is not merely a product looking for capital and a route to market. It is also a web of commitments, dependencies, resources, trust, and shared expectations.

    I wonder whether an underestimated part of value creation lies precisely there.

    Because even with the same idea and the same combination of assets, I can imagine two startups: one creates value, the other fails to gain traction. Perhaps because time horizons, risk appetite, role expectations, and the desire for control were never brought into alignment across the wider relationship network.


    +++ German version +++ Deutsche Version +++

    Gestern Abend bei Pitch & Pretzels in den Räumlichkeiten der KPMG in Köln standen naturgemäß Ideen im Vordergrund.

    Welche Probleme will das Startup lösen? Welchen Markt adressiert es? Wie groß kann das werden? Wie überzeugend ist das Team? Und natürlich: Wie kommen Idee, Kapital und Umsetzung zusammen?

    Doch mich hat noch eine andere Frage beschäftigt: Selbst wenn Idee, Markt und Team überzeugend sind, wie erfolgskritisch ist ein tragfähiges Geflecht aus Beziehungen?

    Mit Co-Foundern. Mit Investoren. Mit Mitarbeitern. Mit ersten Kunden. Mit Lieferanten. Mit Kooperationspartnern. Später vielleicht mit Corporate Partnern, Boards oder Käufern.

    Jede dieser Beziehungen bringt Erwartungen und Vereinbarungen mit sich. Ein Startup ist ja nicht nur ein Produkt auf der Suche nach Kapital und einem Absatzmarkt. Es ist auch ein Geflecht aus Zusagen, Abhängigkeiten, Ressourcen, Vertrauen und gemeinsamen Erwartungen.

    Ich frage mich, ob darin nicht ein unterschätzter Teil der Wertschöpfung steckt.

    Denn selbst mit der gleichen Idee und der selben Kombination aus Assets kann ich mir zwei Startups vorstellen: das eine schafft Wert, das andere kommt nicht voran. Vielleicht weil Zeithorizonte, Risikobereitschaft, Rollenverständnis und Kontrollanspruch im erweiterten Beziehungsnetzwerk nicht in Einklang gebracht wurden?